Foreknowledge, Power and Love: Part I

By: Steve H - March 14, 2005

I promised I would post on this, so here goes. It seems like the hot doctrinal topic for bloggin right now is foreknowledge. I won’t list all of the posts on it because it seems so many have touched on it. In his book on the topic, Blake Ostler opines that while foreknowledge would be neat, it isn’t necessary for faith in God. I would like to set down here my 2cents’ worth on why I feel foreknoweldge is one of three essential traits that allow us to have faith in God. (The other 2, as my title implies, are power and love.)

First, to outline Blake’s argument quickly. I can’t find the page, so I can’t quote it, but he basically says something to the effect that foreknowledge might be neat, and if God had it, he’d ask him about horse races, stocks, or the lottery, but it doesn’t seem to him to be essential to faith.

On the contrary, I feel that foreknowledge is essential. While God may have the power to carry out his wishes and the good will implied by love to do good to us through his actions, without the knowledge that his actions will bring good to us, it does not necessarily follow that his actions will bring good to us. Thus, if I argue with God and say, “Hey, I think that what you are doing might mess up my life,” he could argue, without foreknowledge, “I am really almost sure that you are wrong. ” Despite this, if God doesn’t know in each instance what the effects of his actions will be in bringing about the salvation of each of his children, then he can’t necessarily know that he is right, in the long run, and I am wrong. Thus, while God might be able to claim that it would be wise to follow him, as it would be less likely that we would do things that would mess up our lives, he couldn’t claim that we could have complete faith in following him.

Now, before I leave anyone thinking that there might be some flaw in this whole faith thing, let me also say that I think that a God who could be in any way wrong about future events–that does not certainly know how events will turn out and that each of his actions is absolutely going to cause the greatest good for his children is not scripturally supported. I would like to outline at least two places in scripture that support the idea that God knows not simply the general tenor of the events in the world, but how individual lives will play out, and that this knowledge becomes the basis for the faith of individuals.

The first is Abraham. When contemplating the move from Ur (see Abraham 2), Abraham is probably pretty uneasy. I say this because God has to confort him with assurances that things will turn out as he has said. After listing off evidences ofhis power, God also assures Abraham that he knows what the effects of the use of his power will be:

Verse 8
My name is Jehova, and I know the end from the beginning; therefore my hand shall be over thee.

He goes on to predict many things about Abraham’s future.

Abraham gathers his family, and it is telling that what immpresses him most is not God’s power, as important as that is, but his ability to know the future effects of his actions with certainty:

Verse 16
therefore, eternity was our covering and our rock and our salvation, as we journeyed from Haran by the way of Jershon.

The second is a bit convoluted, but I think it makes sense. In Mosiah, we find the people of Limhi in bondage to the Lamanites. They begin to cry unto the lord for release from their bondage, and though the lord is slow to listen to their cries, he does eventually hear them and eases their burdens. However, he “did not see fit to deliver them from bondage. ” (Mosiah 21:15)

Finally, the Lord does release the people from bondage after Ammon shows up, but through the agency of Gideon, who has always been around. Seems like God is waiting for a moment to release them from bondage, rather than a person. When he finally does release them, the Lamanites follow, but they cannot catch them. Instead, they catch the people of Alma, who were then conveniently in the wrong place at the wrong time. While in bondage, the people of Alma, who have, as far as they know, thrown away everything to leave their people for the Lord are told to be patient. Finally they are delivered.

Fast forward, Alma the younger goes through his rebellious phase and the angel comes to call him back. He does so by recalling the “captivity of thy fathers.” Now, we might write this off as simply adapting the message to the person being preached to, but when Alma the younger becomes the High Priest, this is the same message that needs to be brought to the people in Zarahemla, (Alma 5:6).

It would seem that God not only knew when, exactly, to bring the people of Limhi out of bondage, but he knew whom to prepare with a message about captivity and freedom in this way and he knew that Alma’s son would return to the church to send out that message to the church, otherwise, why prepare his father through so much hardship to pass it on to him?

OK, I know that this may not be proof-positive, but I present this with some of the ideas presented in connection with patriarchal blessings here, at least my comments, as examples of a sense that God does know the end from the beginning inspiring faith and being rewarded.

61 Comments

  1. If God did not have a foreknowledge how could prophecy ever be given? And if He knows the general way things will turn out, so that prophecy is accurate, isn’t the general made up of many specifics?

    I certainly agree, I couldn’t have faith in a God who using His best guess to guide me.

    Comment by Don — 3/15/2005 @ 1:33 pm

  2. As stated before, I’m not sure where I will end up on this. But for the sake of discussion here is an analogy: As a chemist, I can take two compounds (X and Y) and mix them together with a predicted outcome (Z) that is 100% certain. As a chemist, I have no knowledge beyond a certain sensory level. I do not perceive the placement of the individual atoms and I cannot predict their individual location/state. Yet on the macroscopic level, I can say for with certainty (antecedent to the actual experiment) that X + Y = Z. I can say this because I have knowledge in general and also knowledge of the current state of things. I can predict with a 100% certainty what the outcome of a closed system will be. Even if I have never mixed X and Y before, I know that I will get Z.

    Is not everything else beyond that simply a matter of complexity? Can God not be a perfect macroscopic predictor and yet have microcosmic limitations? I guess if you had perfect knowledge, one could be a perfect predictor on all levels – though the computation would be virtually infinite. So maybe the question is whether or not God has perfect knowledge.

    We then need to deal with the question of whether we are truly free if we are perfectly predictable. I don’t necessarily think we are that free so this is not that big of a deal. I don’t necessarily believe freedom equals indeterminacy.

    Comment by J. Stapley — 3/16/2005 @ 3:04 am

  3. Brother Hancock, it seems to me that you have rather missed my point. If God has foreknowledge, then that knowledge is useless to him because it cannot play any role in his providential purposes. For example, the scripture that you cite merely states that ” I know the end from the beginning; therefore my hand shall be over thee.” If God knows his plan, without anything more, then he knows what this scripture asserts. However, if he knows that Araham will offer Isaac, then God does not need “to see if” Abraham will go through with it when tested. Indeed, God cannot plan for what he already knows will be the case nor can he change what he already knows will be the case. is knowledge is useless to him.

    The example of Limhi’s people actually seems to me to better support the view that God formulates his responses as events develop rather than knowing how things will be from the beginning.

    You must answer how it could be possible for God to know that X will be the case, and yet God can “plan” for X (no one plans for something when they already know how it will be). Further, you have to show that God has any control at all over furture events if he has already seen how it will be. For example, let’s say that God has seen that you will reject him and go to hell. God would like to help you to be saved, but to suppose that he could do anything to bring about what he would like to is incoherent — God cannot change what he has seen will certainly be the case.

    Comment by Blake — 3/16/2005 @ 5:08 pm

  4. Blake: Do you think that absolute foreknowledge based on essentially perfect extrapolation is as equally untenable as four dimensionalism? Or are you positing that extrapolation can never yield perfectly accurate results because of the indeterminacy inherent in agency?

    Comment by J. Stapley — 3/17/2005 @ 12:20 am

  5. Blake,
    Two things:
    1. In this post, I am not necessarily addressing the possibility of God’s foreknowledge. I’m addressing the necessity of that foreknowledge. Your argument against this necessity is found on page 139 of your book and deals with a Tasmanian. I agree that foreknowledge would mean nothing without providence. However, my argument is that without foreknowledge providence can’t be foolproof, and that foreknowledge is necessary, therefore. If, in fact, God’s foreknowledge is necessary, then a proof for it must be possible, even if it is not extant in the philosophical literature on the subject. It has always seemed to be impossible that God could know of things to come. This was to some extent Sherem’s argument (Jacob 7:7). (Note: I’m not calling you Sherem, just pointing out that that I see the same argument. Obviously you do not use it in the same way.)
    2. As far as the possibility of the forekowledge of God, I tend to side with Aquinas to some degree, as I understand him. God knows what will happen because he causes it to happen. I don’t necessarily mean that he does not give us agency, but I do believe he knows what we will do with that agency beforehand. What remains is what he will do to ensure that we are given every chance to return to him. In this way, my view is something like middle knowledge. He sees all possibilities given any particular use of his agency. Then, because he will always use his agency to do what will tend to give each of his children the maximal ammount of progression, his course is also determined by this voluntary restriction of his free will. Thus he does know the end from the beginning. This is my understanding of the idea that “all things for their glory are manifest, past, present, and future, and are continually before the Lord.” (my emphasis)
    In the end, I may be wrong about the explanation of God’s foreknowledge, but that doesn’t invalidate the argument for the necessity of that foreknowledge.
    J,
    You get the award for the most opaque comment ever.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 3/17/2005 @ 2:48 am

  6. J,
    Sorry, I can only do this in chunks. I happened to get two chunks close together. I’m not sure that I believe that God knows what we will do purely because of his ability to predict based on physical laws. I’m probably closer to something like 4-dimensionality–at least that he has some other relationship to time than we have–though I have no idea how that works. Because of this, I feel that we are free. God knows what we are going to do, but as long as we do not have that knowledge our actions are the result of our will, even though God knows that will beforehand. In this sense, I am not with Aquinas if you take him to mena that God is the cause of all events. I believe only that he knows the outcomes of all events of which he is not the cause and knows what actions he will take, thus causing al loutcomes that are not determined by other agents.
    P.S.–Despite my remark on your comment, I felt it quite cogent.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 3/17/2005 @ 3:17 am

  7. J. Stapley: It seems to me that given the reality of agency, the predictability of human behavior is probablistic at best. God knows what he himself will bring about and therefore can insure that his plan will be fulfilled. What he doesn’t know, specifically, is who will be saved and/or exalted. The scriptures state that God is looking “to see if” we will keep his commandments — he doesn’t know. There may be some human actions that are so important that God will override human agency and insure that they are brought about — Paul’s conversion may be in this category.

    Comment by Blake — 3/17/2005 @ 11:15 am

  8. No worries Steve, I thought it was a compliment. First, the more I think about it, the more I disagree that absolute foreknowledge is required for reliable providence. Does God need to know the quantum state of every particle in the Universe at every time in the future to give me reliable advice? I would say no. So if God does not require absolute foreknowledge, the question becomes how much does He need? (again, I’m not saying that He doesn’t, just that it doesn’t seem necessary)

    If we accept that God only needs limited foreknowledge to be effectual, the core question seems to morph into something that is very similar to what I think Blake is getting at – does God have the power to bring about His ends?

    It’s like the mind-dependent creation of God entailed the whole Plan of Salvation and not just the first chapters of Genesis. He obviously had power to bring that much together; I believe he has the power to bring the rest to fruition as well.

    I’m the first to confess that our comprehension of the universe is horribly limited. That said, we have already discussed why I think four dimensionalism doesn’t hold up, so I won’t go there (And that is not the point of your post either).

    Comment by J. Stapley — 3/17/2005 @ 11:18 am

  9. Brother Hancock: Of all the possible models of foreknowledge, Aquinas’s is least accetpable in an LDS framework. You essentially adopt the plan that Satan proposed (I’m not suggesting that you’re Satanic). God knows that in 2006 I will rob a 7-11 because he himself causes me to do it on Aquinas’s view. Not only does that destroy agency, it makes God responsible for my sins. You may note that in LDS thought God’s providence isn’t “full-proof” — he doesn’t save everyone. Everything doesn’t always go his way. So you seem to me to want a view of divine providence that is at odds with the fundamental LDS commitments.

    As for middle knowledge, you must explain how an LDS person could possibly adopt it when we don’t believe in creation out of nothing which is an essential feature of that view. Most importantly, when you assert that you affirm foreknowledge but do not (at least implicitly) deny agency, you must deal with the Argument B that I gave showing that agency and foreknowledge are logically incompatible. On the scriptural side, you must explain those dozen or so scriptures that I cite that show that God doesn’t have absolute foreknowlege. In addition, the scripture that you cite from D&C 130 doesn’t say that all things past, present and future are before God, but only that “all things for their [i.e., the angels’ glory] is manifest” — and thus it seems fairly clear that it is talking about God’s plan for them and not about the present reality of the future as if it already existed (which would make it present and not future). So the scriptural bases for your belief seems tenuous, at best, to me.

    Comment by Blake — 3/17/2005 @ 11:25 am

  10. J,
    I’m not sure that I believe God’s knowledge has to be “quantum,” though I think that would be the less difficult thing to do. Since Christ is in all things, and through all things, that would seem to be possible at least. I think knowing what people will do with their agency is the more difficult thing to do, but I think it is what is most essential.

    Blake,
    I never said I buy in totally to Aquinas or middle knowledge. My particular hybrid of these is that he knows what I will do with my agency, though it remains my agency, and he knows what he will do with his agency because he voluntarily restricts it for the good of his children.

    As for your argument B, I can’t see how premise B7 is not circular as it pertains to refuting the objection that while God knows that Rock will sin tomorrow, Rock does not know it, and it is Rock’s power of choice that will bring about Rock’s sin. In fact, throughout the “proof” you assume that if God knew Rock would do a thing then Rock doesn’t have a choice in the matter. I object that it is Rock’s choice that God knows, you reply that I am worng because if God knows it then Rock can’t avoid it. Thus in refuting me, you simply assume the thing that you attempt to prove. I know that this seems intuitive to you, but it seems quite as intuitive to me that if I have no idea what I will do in five minutes, and God has left that up to me, it doesn’t matter whether he knows what I will do; I still have the choice in doing it. It seems that the only way your point of view is intuitive is if God knows through the medium, often posited, that he simply knows us so well that he knows what we will do in any situation. Sort of a social constructivist or essentialist view (or some combination) that says I’m just that way. Either god made me this way, or situations that God can comprehend made me this way. Therefore I can’t act any other way. I don’t know that I believe that. In fact, I have no idea how God knows what I will do, but I do believe, to the contrary that what God knows he knows in some radical way. That is, my choice is radically free, and yet God knows what I will do with that choice notwithstanding. My choice is not situationally or essentially determined, and yet God knows how I will act despite this. Thus, if I do not know how I will act, my choice is free.

    As for the scriptural argument, I read D&C 130 a bit differently. I’ll quote it in full here.

    But they reside in the presence of God, on a globe like a sea of glass and fire, where all things for their glory are manifest, past, present, and future, and are continually before the Lord.

    It is the Lord for whom all things for the Glory of his children are manifest. The angels are the ones whose glory is concerned, but there are no angels but those who belong to this earth. That is to say that they are his children who have come to or are going to come to this earth. On the globe where they reside, God can see all things, past, present and future that would bring about his childrens’ glory, that is, he can see perfectly the effects of any use of his agency so that it will tend towards the glory of his children.

    As far as agency is concerned, you admit that in controlling the future of this world, there would be certain events that would be so important that they would have to happen. I think that it is much more probable that God would know these events than that he would coerece certain people into doing right so that the plan works out. Paul might be one example, as you point out, but I would htink that Joseph Smith would be another, and one whose circumstances and name were explicitly prophesied. I don’t think that the prophet was coerced. Even more essential might be the savior, unless we assume that there was no chance that he might sin, and thus, given your paradigm, that he had no agency, something I very much doubt.

    When I say that God’s providence is “fool proof,” I do not mean that it will bring everyone home to him, but that he will give each of his children the absolute greatest chance to come back to him. It will not be his fault, but ours if we do not return. I don’t see that as satan’s plan.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 3/17/2005 @ 1:29 pm

  11. Brother Hanckock: Your assertion that argument B assumes that Rock doesn’t have a choice is plainly false. I demonstrate that if God has foreknowledge, then the supposition that Rock has a choice is false. It is not assumed; it is explicit. Further, whether Rock knows the future is irrelevant to the conclusion of the argument since nowhere does the argument assume such a fact to derive the conclusion that foreknowledge and and free will are incompatible. I haven’t assumed what I must prove; rather, I have given an argument showing it. Moreover, nowhere does the argument assume that the basis of God’s knowledge is our character or essence — it simply provides a premise which assumes that God has foreknowledge. So I respectfully suggest that your response is seriously flawed — I’d like to say that more respectfully I just don’t know how to convey the point without saying it.

    Your assertion that premise (B7) is circular is strange to me. It follows directly from two premises that you accept, namely, B5 and B6. It is not circular; rather, it is a logical conclusion from what you say you accept. Perhaps you could explain how it is circular rather than just assert that it is. Perhaps you could explain how the argument assumes that Rock is not free — rather than just assert it. In fact, it does no such thing. It assumes a view of free will and shows that libertarian free will is not compatible with foreknowledge. So I admit to just being confused by your response.

    Further, since the argument neither assumes nor requires that Rock knows the future to derive the conclusion that free will and foreknowledge are not compatible, your assertion that there is no problem since Rock doesn’t know his own future is demonstrated by Argument B to be false. Moreover, what of God who does know his own future? Your own response entails that God is not free because he knows his own future. Certainly that conclusion is unacceptable.

    As for D&C 130, it clearly states the angels reside in God’s presence that what is present to God are the angels — and not the past, present and future. What is manifest are all things for the glory of the angels in the context of God’s plan — and not the past, present and future. I have dealt with this scripture on pp. 151-53. I just don’t see it supporting your point the way you think that it does.

    Moreover, what will you do with God’s changing his mind to destroy Israel in Ex. 32, or to destroy Ninevah in Jonah? If God knew the future, then why would he believe that Israel would be destroyed when in fact it was not? How could God predict that the temple at Independence would be built within that generation and then revoke his commandment if he has foreknowledge? (See D&C 121:51-53) The scriptural record seems to me to contrary to the view you espouse.

    So I thank you for your resopnse — but I am confused at why you make the assertions you do.

    Comment by Blake — 3/17/2005 @ 9:18 pm

  12. J.: the more I think about it, the more I disagree that absolute foreknowledge is required for reliable providence

    Nice. I knew you’d come around sooner or later!

    Blake: There may be some human actions that are so important that God will override human agency and insure that they are brought about — Paul’s conversion may be in this category.

    This is the mess you get yourself into for disregarding too much of the doctrine taught by Brigham and Heber! (Much of which was true in my opinion.) As soon as you leave room for God to break his own rules about agency then you leave your own arguments wide open for blasting. Steve did a gentle job of that later with regard to this subject. I don’t believe God can override agency. I think it is an eternal law that He must obey lest he cease to be God. The conversion of Paul did not override his agency and coerce him to be converted — it was simply a very strong invitation. Paul could have easily rejected the invitation — as others had before with heavenly invitations — but based on his character and nature he embraced it wholeheartedly.

    The bigger question is how does God justify giving Paul such an invitation and not the rest of us? It was different than the case of Alma the younger because he had his father and the whole church praying for intervention. That faithful heavenly petitioning opened the door for that miracle. So how do we explain Paul’s experience? I think the only answer that leaves justice intact is that Paul merited such intervention based on prior behavior. When I say prior I mean pre-mortal. At some point during Paul’s pre-mortal life (lives) he had qualified for such unusual intervention in this life. Lest we doubt his true character (as developed before this life), simply look at his life after learning this simple fact about Jesus. How many on the earth would be like Paul even with a conversion experience like his? Not many.

    Steve: First I think it is important to separate the terms foreknowledge and absolute foreknowledge. Those of us who believe God does not (and can not, if there is real free agency) have absolute foreknowledge still believe he accurately predicts the vast majority of future events — the doctrine simply state that there are some thing that are contingent. God plans and prepares for all contingencies though so there is no need for a fixed future for God to have the ability to save and exalt us.

    I think much of the problem you have with it is the chance limited forknowledge leaves open that God could make a mistake. I suppose this is possible. But how does that cause a problem? It only causes a problem if there is some sort of deadline that is more powerful than God. If there is no deadline then he could continue to work with us, to mentor us, to help us become as he is throughout all the eternities to come. He has already been doing that for the eternities past so how could this particular mortal probation somehow end his power to do so in the future? Our scriptures tell us the worlds without number and the inhabitants thereof that came before this world — if we believe our scriptures then we can have an easy time believing He does know how to bring about the eternal life of man because he has been doing so throughout all eternity.

    Actually, the more I think about the subject of absolute foreknowledge the more I believe it is a pernicious doctrine that engenders a faith-crippling sense of fatalism. I’ll write a post on that subject at my blog soon…

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — 3/18/2005 @ 12:21 am

  13. Geoff,
    Your explanation of limited foreknowledge is perhaps the most plausible I’ve heard. I still have troubles with it for the reasons you state. I don’t believe God is surprised by anything, really, that happens here.
    Also, I don’t find the doctrine of absolute foreknowledge faith-crippling, and I don’t look at it as fatalism. As long as I have the chance to choose, something I don’t believe is denied us by the concept of absolute foreknowledge, then it isn’t fatalsim. I’ll look forward, however, to your post.
    Blake,
    Quickly,
    On B7–the particular line item here, simply seems to restate your premise to me. I never said I particularly agree with the preceding items, but I think this is where the real circularity starts.
    On free-will generally–I think we are on different pages. You are operating under the assumption that God’s knowledge is the important thing and that therefore your proof shows my argument to be flawed. I am operating under the assumption that individual knowledge is what is essential and that therefore your argument is flawed. In some ways I think the problem has to do with limitations on our ability to argue the point. Agency and choice are the word we have for this phenomenon. Really the phenomenon is not one that is explainable with recourse to other phenomenon, so our conception of it beyond that point seems, to me to be intuitive. This, I believe is why in your book you so often have recourse to what “seems” to you to be the case. (I don’t have the book any more and no time to quote pages.) I don’t think that given our limited understanding of agency that we can determine logically whether individual knowledge or God’s knowledge would be essential since we don’t really understand even how God relates to temporal knowledge–or even knowledge in the sense that we undertand it all perhaps. As a result, I think we are intuiting the idea of agency in different ways and it is keeping us from seeing the other’s point of view.
    On Ninevah and Israel–I had no idea how committed you were to this idea. I can’t believe that God was surprised by these things.

    Comment by Steve H — 3/18/2005 @ 1:21 am

  14. Steve: Premise B7 may seem to restate what was previously stated to you, but you need to show that rather than merely assert it. It does restate what was previously stated but only in the sense that it is a conclusion that follows from prior premises stating that God has foreknowledge and we cannot change the past. (Logical conclusions that follow from a valid argument are always implicit in the foregoing premises and so your objection is really to the way that valid logical argumentation works — which is a very strange objection to say the least). The argument is valid — and your objections to it are objections to the way logically valid arguments work. That is not a legitimate objection in my book (in fact it is desperate beyond belief).

    As for our “limited knowledge of agency,” isn’t it rather pellucidly clear that it at least requires choices among alternatives (like between good and evil)? That is all that is necessary to derive the conclusion that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible. So I agree that there may be many dimensions of agency that we don’t grasp; nevertheless, we do grasp what is essential to generate the incompatibility argument.

    As for why you cannot believe that God was surprised, notice that when Abraham offers up Isaac he says “now I know” that you will withhold nothing. Could I gently suggest that your commitment to your prior theological view is so intransigent that you refuse to believe the scriptures when they present a reality different than you demand? Yes I am committed to Exodus 32 and Johah because they are scriptural (though not inerrant) and I am puzzled at why you cite certain scriptures and then ignore these — and even expression surprise when I cite scriptures that demonstrate that your view must account for these scriptures (which BTW you dodged and did not answer). They demonstrate that your view isn’t adequate for all scriptural accounts.

    Comment by Blake — 3/18/2005 @ 10:35 am

  15. Geoff: When God strikes down Ananias and Sapphira for not contributing their fair share to the common fund in Acts 5, he certainly takes away their agency to act (death is a rather severe inhibitor to the exercise of agency). So God can take away our agency (e.g., by killing us, paralyzing us [like he did Laman and Lemue when Nephi shocked theml], blinding us [like he did Paul] and so forth). God seems to intervene much more forcefully sometimes than others (Christ’s appearance to Paul and to Alma the Younger are good examples of rather drastic intervention). It seems to me that if he doesn’t take away agency in these instance (and blindness and paralysis are severe inhibitors of agency) he at least significantly truncates it. However, you are correct that I believe that God can make accurate prophecies and has done so, but they may turn out not to be accurate (and I believe that scripture gives us several instances where it has occured) when what is predicted is contingent on free human action. God can infallibly predict what he himself will bring about.

    Comment by Blake — 3/18/2005 @ 10:42 am

  16. Steve: You started this post out by asserting that God’s foreknowledge is in fact useful to him in his providential agency. When I pointed out that simple foreknowledge binds God to a determinate future that he cannot change becaue it logically obtains before he can do anything about it, you retreat to Aquinas’s view and Molinism. When I point out that these are not viable options (especially for LDS) you back off and say you really don’t adopt them, you merely assert that “my particular hybrid of these is that he knows what I will do with my agency, though it remains my agency, and he knows what he will do with his agency because he voluntarily restricts it for the good of his children.” However, this is not a view of agency and foreknowledge that is compatible, but merely an assertion (without support) that they are compatible. I return to this discussion because you are right back where you started — God’s forknowledge is providentially useless to him. You still haven’t shown how God’s foreknowledge could be of any use to him. You don’t have a view that is an alternative to simple foreknowledge — you are long on assertion and short on giving us a viable view.

    Comment by Blake — 3/18/2005 @ 10:50 am

  17. Blake: Good points. I had to give this some thought. However I think my previous statements can stand despite the examples you give here. I posit that God striking us dead actually has no impact on our agency. We remain completely free to choose — the only difference is our location (spirit world vs. this earth). The same can be said for physical limitations. For instance, if Michael Jordan has the physical ability to pull off a 360 degree dunk and I don’t does that mean my agency is limited? I don’t think so. The same could be said for someone who sees vs someone who is blind… they both have the same amount of agency don’t they?

    I think the most interesting question is how does God do all of this without violating laws of justice and mercy. I can only assume that in the case of Ananias and Sapphira that cutting their mortal probation short was a merciful (as well as just) solution for them and that it was best for all involved. When I say best I mean it matched up with God’s mission statement best.

    Steve: I don’t believe God is surprised by anything, really, that happens here.

    We may be agreeing then because there is a huge difference between absolute foreknowledge and never being surprised. What Blake has so well defended in his book is still a God who is never surprised in my opinion. I have posted before that between the database of worlds without end before this one, the predictability of group behavior through the indeterminacy principle, and God’s computing power he could come up with a predictive model that is nearly the same as absolute foreknowledge but not the same.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — 3/18/2005 @ 11:55 am

  18. Geoff,
    I see what you are getting at here. I don’t know that I agree, but I also don’t know, seeing Blake’s other comments that this is exactly what he’s defending here. That is to say that Blake seems to be denying that prophesy is a sure bet. God can infallibly predict what he himself will bring about. seems to me to be a bit unsatisfying. A bit like me predicting that I will very soon hit the comment button. Sure the lights could go out, but otherwise, it’s going to happen. the only difference for God, then would be that he has the power to make sure the lights don’t go out. I’ve been reading Job lately, and as his friends try to rebuke him for not having faith in God’s power, he admits God’s power, but seems to me, in 12 and 13, to suggest that there needs to be more than power behind faith in God.
    Blake,
    Limited time to respond to everything here. That’s part of the problem.
    When I say I am surprised, my surprise is that it seems to me that you are denying that prophesy is a sure thing as I state above. As far as the particular instances you state, I am not dodging, but looking for time to do the research I want to do before answering.
    As for my changing position because of your remarks, please re-read the comment in which I made my original remarks, where I do not contend that I agree with either of these views in any entire way.
    I tend to side with Aquinas to some degree, as I understand him
    my view is something like middle knowledge

    That’s all I have time for at the moment. Gotta prepare for class.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 3/18/2005 @ 1:20 pm

  19. Geoff: If God strikes us down (like he did to the Israelites when they made the golden calf) then he forecloses an entire range of possible choices to us and renders us unfree in that respect. Could he make it so that we must love him? Here I would agree that God cannot force us to love him. But he could render us unconscious for eternity thus making us unfree in all respects. So it seems possible for God to take away our agency, though it seems rather clear that he cannot force us to do what in principle cannot be forced. Moreover, consider the scriptural statements that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart. A straightforward reading suggests that teaching Israel that Yahweh is more powerful than Pharaoh was so important that he didn’t leave it up to Pharaoh to choose whether this lesson would be taught (if Pharaoh had just let them go then they would have had to chalk up the grace of freedom to Pharaoh rather than to Yahweh).

    Steve and Geoff: I believe that God is surprised. I believe that he was surprised that Ninevah repented since he predicted Ninevah’s destruction. I believe that he was surprised that the temple in Independence Mo. wasn’t built within one generation — since he predicted and then later changed his prediction. I think that he was surprised that Abraham offered Isaac in the sense that he wasn’t sure before he did it and thus he said “now I know.” I think he was surprised when Israel rejected him because God felt like a husband whose wife had been unfaithful and a father whose son had gone astray. Moreover, in Jeremiah 3:7, 19 God expressly states that he thought Israel would remain faithful even though it went astray. You are of course free to reject these scriptures — but to me they are the most intimate in the Bible. When God says in Abraham 3 “we will see if they will do whatsoever the Lord God will command them,” I believe the future tense of the verb and the “if” are genuine.

    One thing seems rather clear to me — you cannot argue that my view isn’t scriptural and then pick and choose your scriptures. You cannot just ignore some scriptures that disagree with your view while relying on others (unless you have some principaled basis for doing so I suppose).

    I invite you to reread the scriptures that speak of God predicting the future and knowing the end from the beginning (e.g., 1 Ne. 9:6 and Isa. 46:9-10). In context they state that God has power to bring about his word and therefore he can predict such things. That is, his knowledge of the future is a function of his power and his knowledge that he can accomplish whatever he desires to bring about on his own — and that doesn’t require absolute foreknowledge.

    Comment by Blake — 3/18/2005 @ 8:47 pm

  20. Blake,
    Not a lot of time, but the Pharoah passages have been specifically corrected by the prophet Joseph. Are you suggesting by “straightforward reading” a reading that assumes that this translation wasn’t an important part of our understanding of the story? I count at least 13 corrections made specifically to make the issue clear.
    I won’t argue that God can’t restrict our agency in the sense that he hasn’t the power to force us, but I think the scriptures are quite clear that we can choose good or evil. He won’t force us, as you suggest he could, to love him.
    In Abraham 3, God is speaking to someone. I don’t know that the ifs in God’s word are for God’s benefit. I think they are mostly for others.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 3/18/2005 @ 9:28 pm

  21. Steve: You are quite correct that the JST changes all of the statements to “Pharaoh hardened his heart” rather than God hardened his heart. I’m quite sure that I don’t buy it — the mss. are quite clear that it is Pharaoh and not God — but my point is merely that God could do it (and there are important purposes served in the narrative by having God harden Pharaoh’s heart). For that matter, the JST changes all of the passages that say that God repents — and I don’t buy those either. However, the change to JST Exodus 32:13-14 makes it even clearer that God changed his mind! So go figure.

    BTW, I don’t suggest that God can force us to love him but expressly deny that. By its very nature, love must be freely chosen and cannot be coerced or forced or manipulated. If I understood your post, you were suggested that I argue that God can force us to love him.

    As for the suggestion that when God speaks he uses “if” for the benefit of those to whom he is speaking, I ask: “how could it benefit us if the “if” isn’t genuine”? Moreover, are you suggesting that God doesn’t mean it even though he says it?

    Comment by Blake — 3/18/2005 @ 11:34 pm

  22. Blake: I believe that God is surprised.

    You provide some compelling evidence here. I can buy your argument that God can be surprised. I need to qualify my previous posts to say that nothing happens that God isn’t prepared for. I envision a predictive model that allows for probabilities and that sometimes the thing that had a 80% probability of happening doesn’t happen and the thing that had a 1% chance of happening does. I propose that God is prepared for all possible occurrences so in a sense he is not totally surprised even when something 4 standard deviations out happens because he is prepared for that unlikely event but at the same time it is always surprising when something 4 standards deviations out happens. (I hope that makes sense to someone else besides me). So yes he can be surprised but I think he is still prepared. God tells us “If ye are prepared ye shall not fear” and I’m certain he practices what he preaches.

    It sounds like we do disagree on the question of God overriding our agency, though (and I am alone on this one because Steve agrees with you). I don’t think He ever does override our agency. You support this claim by giving another example of him ending mortal probations (in the golden calf incident) but that doesn’t have any sway on me because I don’t think death has any effect on agency. I think death only affects our location. You then say:

    But he could render us unconscious for eternity thus making us unfree in all respects.

    This is new doctrine to me. Are there scriptural or prophetic utterances to support this claim?

    It seems to me that Joseph went out of his way to correct the idea that God overrode Pharaoh’s agency. I take this as a strong indication that God won’t do that or possibly even that he can’t if he is to remain God.

    Of course I’ve been wrong before, so since both you and Steve agree that God can override our agency can you show me evidence to help me see the light?

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — 3/19/2005 @ 12:36 am

  23. Geoff,
    I do not believe that God can override our agency. That is to say, he might be able to, I don’t know. But he never would. In fact, I think it’s part of his being God that he never would. So, in terms of his overriding our agency and remaining God, in the sense of a father whose only concern is the immortality and eternal life of his children, I say he couldn’t.
    Blake,
    I’m saying the if is quite genuine, from our standpoint, which I tend to see as the heart of this issue. For our part, we do not know whether we will be exalted. Heck, I don’t know whether I’ll get the gumption to mow the yard tomorrow. Thus from my standpoint, the trying needs to be done.
    The actual text of Abraham 3:25 is:
    we will prove them now herewith to see if they will do all things whatsoever the Lord their God will command them
    The proving here is the necessary part. We must be proven, so as I see it this life is a proving grounds. God knows what we will do, but only in allowing us to do it can he give us agency.
    As far as not buying the JST . . . I do.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 3/19/2005 @ 1:37 am

  24. Steve: You don’t believe that the “if” is genuine because you qualify it — the if is true only “from our standpoint.” What you mean by that seems rather obvious — “from our limited viewpoint which is ignorant of the way things really are.” You mean that for God, whose perspective must be seen as privileged and fully informed, there is no “if.” So what you say is a genuine “if” only arises from our ignorance of the way things really are on your view. It is not genuine. It is not spoken truthfully from God’s standpoint on your view. Moreover, in the scripture it is God speaking and not a human. He is stating that his purpose is “to see if” — and that means uncertainty as to how things will be.

    Geoff: To assert that God never takes away agency is foolish in one sense. God clearly takes away agency to act in this sphere when he kills people. Moreover, God could take away what I will call our our “metaphyscial agency” altogether if he desired in the manner I described — he could render us physically unconscious forever. However, I agree with ou that out of love God would never actually take away our metaphysical agency in all respects. Indeed, out of love he respects our decisions (although death is a rather severe truncation of the range of decisions open to us don’t you think?). However, he allows us to give away our agency so that we become slaves to the devil, caught in the patterns of our past and sins.

    As for God hardening Pharaoh’s heart — the JST changes those passages which tells us about Joseph Smith and Sidney Rigdon’s point of view. However, the manuscripts don’t support this change so I believe that the textual evidence shows that the Israelites did believe that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart. They also believed that God “repented” and Joseph Smith and Sidney Rigdon also changed all of those passages. I believe that JS took these passages to mean that God did something wrong since in English the word “repent” connotes repentance from sins and thus connotes in translation something that is not true — i.e., that God did something wrong of which he needed to repent. However, in Hebrew the verb used, shuv, merely means to change one’s mind or one’s course of action. I believe that JS rejected the view that God did something wrong that needed to be repented, but he accepted that God could change his mind (as evidenced by his changes to Exodus 32 which make it even clearer that God changed his mind). So what is important to my view is preserved in the JST and not challenged by it.

    Comment by Blake — 3/19/2005 @ 11:37 am

  25. Geoff: We are in agreement that God is prepared for all possible eventualities. Such a conclusion is entailed in the master chess player analogy. God may be surprised by the particular moves we make though he is certain to win the game.

    Comment by Blake — 3/19/2005 @ 11:44 am

  26. Geoff: As I have thought about it, what is important to my view is that God can guarantee his plan in this sphere of existence by coercing humans or taking away their agency if he so desires. Your point that even killing us doesn’t take away our agency in the hereafter is therefore beside the point to the point that I was making.

    Comment by Blake — 3/19/2005 @ 11:48 am

  27. Blake: I love the chess analogy — thanks for that one.

    Good point about how killing people is one way God can ensure his plans are fulfilled on this planet too. I completely agree that he can do those sorts of things. It seems to me he could do so without violating eternal laws of justice or mercy and also not violate our agency because we remain free agents wherever we are living — meaning before this life, in this life, or after this life. (BTW — I actually don’t think death truncates the range of decisions open to us very much).

    As for disagreeing with Joseph and Sidney on who hardened Pharaoh’s heart (God or Pharaoh), I think you have a hard row to hoe there. Seeing as how Joseph met God personally and spoke with him on a regular basis and all I am inclined to take Joseph’s opinion on God’s refusal to interfere with Pharaoh’s agency over conflicting opinions. You make an interesting argument, though. Have you fleshed this idea out more elsewhere? (As an aside, I think you make a much stronger argument about God Changing his own mind, which was translated as “repenting”. I’m with you on that one)

    My main qualm with what you said is this:

    Moreover, God could take away what I will call our our “metaphyscial agency” altogether if he desired in the manner I described — he could render us physically unconscious forever.

    This is basically the same thing you said before but you still have not provided any evidence to support this assertion. I assumed there was some, but perhaps this is simply an opinion you have on the subject. I’m also not really sure I know what you mean here. First, I assume you don’t really mean “physically unconscious forever” because it makes no sense. (Mortals in comas eventually die.) So maybe you mean spiritually unconscious, which I also don’t think God can do because I don’t think God can violate our agency. Turning off our spiritual consciousness seems to be the same as obliterating us to me. Can you explain what you mean by that?

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — 3/19/2005 @ 2:20 pm

  28. Geoff: It’s simply a logical point that God could, if he wished, take away our agency — put us in a state of complete unconsciousness and then preserve us in that state forever. I don’t believe he would ever actually do it — out of love. But he could — and thus even the most drastic circumstances can be handled by him. But it is merely a logical observation. I’m not really wedded to, it just seems to be true.

    As for hardening Pharaoh’s heart, I’m simply open to the possiblity that God could do it and did it. Heck, given my background in neurophysiology I could control your behavior pretty closely with drugs — and I’m sure that God is infinitely more resourceful than I am. That is why I believe there just isn’t a problem when God assures us that he can bring about his plan despite the fact that he doesn’t know future contingents.

    BTW, Steve, I’m still waiting for some non-question begging explanation of all of these scriptures that say that God changes his mind or mis-predicts the future. I’m also still waiting for some explanation as to how God knows the future that could be providentially useful to him but does not destroy our agency.

    Comment by Blake — 3/19/2005 @ 2:51 pm

  29. OK,
    I’m going to summarize and wrap up a bit and try to answer as much as I can.

    At this point, Geoff has certainly given me the most likely explanation I have heard of the possibility of limited foreknowledge. It allows that God could eventually provide for those contingencies that aren’t currently provided for. I still have problems with it because:

    There are certain events that simply must be known that imply foreknowing the agency of some agents. God the father had to know that the savior would complete the atonement, for instance. Without that, everything falls apart. And yet, I can’t believe that Christ didn’t have agency. So god had to forsee that use of agency. Joseph Smith would be another example. Joseph restoring the gospel had been prophesied in terms so specific that it had to happen in the way it did. I don’t buy that he would prophesy this and then it might or might not happen. The second coming would be another instance. We know that the second coming must be prepared and God knows when that will happen. He knows when we will be prepared. D&C 121:26 seems to me to imply that God knows when each of us will die. That would entail knowing how many murderers, drunken drivers, etc–as well as those who chose not to do these things–were going to use their agency. If God knew how these people were going to use their agency, then I don’t see any reason why he should not know how others would use their agency.

    I don’t buy at all the idea that God would simply take away the agency of some people to ensure that the important thing happens, though this discussion has helped me to understand that such is probably the logical conclusion if we give up the notion of foreknowledge of how agents will use their agency. I am especially dubious that he would force key actors in the salvation of men to play out their parts, even though those parts might be essential. Blake, it seems to me that your position, intended to save agency from what I don’t see as a threat at all, seems to cede agency, at least in some cases.

    Prophecy also takes a severe hit. I know that you claim prophecy is always a sort of this might happen sort of thing, but if things aren’t going to happen, or aren’t sure to happen, why predict them? James E Talmage put it this way: “Divine revelation of what is to come is proof of foreknowledge. God, therefore, knows, and has known from the beginning, what shall be, even to the end of the world. . . .” I can’t give up prophecy as sure. I could debate the specifics of a situation. Ninevah, for example. We have a verse explaining what Jonah said to the Ninevites here. I hardly think it covers the whole of his discourse. So if the conversation goes something like this:

    The Lord’s going to destroy your city.
    Why?
    You are wicked.
    What if we repent?
    Don’t know; why don’t you try?

    People repent, Lord turns away his anger. Doesn’t change his mind. At one point they are in danger of his anger; once they repent it’s turned away. I’m being just a bit flippant perhaps, but again, I don’t think God didn’t know simply because he couldn’t tell them they would repent and it would be alright. Seems self-defeating. Anyway, I still believe, “the Spirit speaketh the truth … of things as they really are, and … as they really will be.” [Jacob 4:13] That is, the spirit of prophesy tells us the truth, not a good guess. (Also, the Exodus JST seems to me to support this reading of such passages, since it basically says, if they repent, I’ll spare them. He doesn’t say whether they will repent, just what will happen if they don’t and what will happen if they do. To tell them whether they will repent would tamper, I think, with their agency, as I will now discuss.)

    So what becomes of agency with foreknowledge? I still contend that we are free to choose, and it is our actions, brought about by the force of our agency which God is foreseeing. He does not force our agency simply by knowing what we will do with it. People often believe that the veil is there because God being around was too great a coercion—that we wouldn’t do things because he might zap us. I don’t buy that. People rebelled in heaven with him around. I think it is at least partly to protect our agency. I also think this is why God speaks to us as if our agency is uncertain. To us it is. He acts as if we had a real decision to make because we really do. Again from Elder Talmage: “But who will venture to affirm that foreknowledge is a determining cause? God’s omniscience concerning Adam cannot reasonably be considered the cause of the Fall. Adam was free to do as he chose to do. God did not force him to obey the divine command. Neither did God’s knowledge compel false Judas to betray the Christ, nor the recreant Jews to crucify their Lord.”

    Take Abraham. I subscribe to George Q. Cannon’s view:

    God did not do this for His own sake; for He knew by His foreknowledge what Abraham would do; but the purpose was to impress upon Abraham a lesson, and to enable him to attain unto knowledge that he could not obtain in any other way. That is why God tries all of us. It is not for His own knowledge for He knows all things beforehand. He knows all your lives and everything you will do.

    though I think there is also room for the idea that perhaps God the father has foreknowledge that the son does not have, especially before the resurrection and atonement. Christ certainly said that he didn’t know when his second coming would be when he was still on the earth, which would be appropriate since, in addition to being the savior of the world, he was an agent on this world.

    As for argument B, I still feel that when you make the move to saying that Rock cannot prevent what God knows you are merely restating what you are trying to prove. The question isn’t whether Rock can prevent it. Rock will cause it, so whether Rock can prevent what Rock will cause seems like a rather dubious question to ask. You might say, “But really, how can anyone understand how God can know something will be caused by someone before it is caused?” I would probably agree that we can’t really understand how it happens. At most—and I’ll cede this though I don’t believe it; it doesn’t seem counterintuitive at all to me—you have proven that the reasons that agency and foreknowledge are compatible are not to be understood within the framework of analytic philosophy, or even human logic generally. Still, if we can see that such must be the case in order that Gods plan function, we must accept that it really must happen that way though that might lead us beyond the confines of rationalist modes of thought: Mosiah 4:9, “believe that man doth not comprehend all the things which the Lord can comprehend.” I would rely first on what must be true, and then discover what I am able to comprehend, rather than discovering what I can comprehend and then assuming this to be the way the Lord works.

    As for D&C 130, I’ll fall back on John Taylor:

    It is written here in the Book of Doctrine and Covenants, that the planet on which he lives is a great Urim and Thummim, which reveals everything pertaining to this lower world and its inhabitants. And the holy beings who reside there can gaze upon us mortals whenever they please, looking also into the future or the past; hence they know it as it is. (JD, December 31, 1876, 18:328.)

    Brigham Young says much the same thing in slightly different words.

    This then would be how “The great Jehovah contemplated the whole of the events connected with the earth, pertaining to the plan of salvation, before it rolled into existence, or ever ‘the morning stars sang together’ for joy,” and “the past, the present, and the future were and are, with him, one eternal ‘now’.” (Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, p. 220.)

    And I’ll finish this gargantuan comment by coming back to the reason that this would be essential, rather than nice,

    “Without the knowledge of all things, God would not be able to save any portion of his creatures; for it is by reason of the knowledge which he has of all things, from the beginning to the end, that enables him to give that understanding to his creatures by which they are made partakers of eternal life; and if it were not for the idea existing in the minds of men that God has all knowledge it would be impossible for them to exercise faith in him.” (Joseph Smith, Lectures on Faith, No. 4.)

    The agency thing and the prophecy thing are two of the reasons why this would be, along with the providence thing, which I know you (Blake) don’t buy.

    I’d better get to bed now. I’ll keep watching this post, though I may not be able to write this much again.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 3/21/2005 @ 2:32 am

  30. Good grief, Steve. You out-did yourself with that novel! Give me an hour or so to read it… then I’ll see if I have anything interesting to say in response… ; )

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — 3/21/2005 @ 12:10 pm

  31. Geoff,
    I even forgot a part. I forgot to thank you and Blake for helping me to think through the issue in new and interesting ways, and inspiring me to do the research I should have done long ago. That is, for me, always the reason I blog.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 3/21/2005 @ 12:26 pm

  32. Steve, you have crystallized allot of the thoughts on this subject that have been fleeting about my mind. I would only add that I don’t think absolute foreknowledge is incompatible with the idea of God changing his mind.

    I know that Blake and Clark have had conversations along theses lines, but Clark doesn’t have a search function at his blog and I am too impatient to sieve through it all. But the idea that God has a set course and changes it upon experiencing the supplication of our prayers seems very coherent.

    Comment by J. Stapley — 3/21/2005 @ 6:12 pm

  33. […] would actually be quite useless to God here, here, and here. Steve Hancock brought up the subject again recently over at Splendid Sun. Some people believe absolute foreknowledge an […]

    Pingback by New Cool Thang » — 3/21/2005 @ 8:15 pm

  34. I’m going to break down my response to several distinct points. In this post I will tackle the notion that both S. Hancock and J. Stapely buy into — viz., that God can change his mind even if he has absolute foreknowledge. The reason why both accept this point is fairly clear — the scriptures are clear that God changes his mind. (See pp. 305-308 of my book). The JST Ex. 32:13-14 says: “Therefore, see thou do this which I have commanded thee, or I will execute all that which I thought to do unto my people.” What God had thought to do to his people Israel was destroy them. and raise up a great nation out of the seed of Moses. God also changes his mind about the command to build the temple in Independence. He actually “revokes” the command that he gave. (D&C 124:51, 53)

    Now it is also fairly clear why absolute foreknowledge is inconsistent with God’s changing his mind. Take for example God’s statement that he intended to destroy Israel. At t1 he intended to destroy Israel, and therefore belived at t1 that Israel would be destroyed. At t2 God changed his mind about destroying Israel and decided to relent and preserve Israel. Therefore, at t2 God believes that Israel will be preserved. So at t1 God did not know that Israel would be preserved, for it is manifestly inconsistent for God to intend to destroy Israel at t1 and yet believe at t1 that it will be preserved. So God didn’t know the future because at t1 he believed something about the future of Israel that turned out to be false (precisely because he changed his mind). So let’s put behind us the non-sense that God can have absolute foreknowledge and yet also change his mind. These scriptures assume that God does not have foreknowledge for the reasons given.

    Comment by Blake — 3/21/2005 @ 10:22 pm

  35. I next want to take on Hancock’s assertion that God knew that the atonement would occur so he had to know that Jesus would exercise his agency to bring it about. Three observations are in order. First, it is God himself who comes down to bring about atonement. (See Mosiah 15) Thus, the atonement is not left to just anyone, but is given as a mission to the person least likely to fail in the entire history of the universe. This condition is consistent with the provisions I state that God knows he can bring about what he determines he will bring about. Second, Christ is due our praise precisely because he was free to reject the bitter cup given to him, but he freely drank it anyway out of love for us.

    Third, those like Hancock and Stapley who insist that there was no chance that Jesus might choose not to drink that bitter cup in essence reject that he was free to do so. They insist that there is no risk in salvation, thereby making the same demand that Satan made on the plan of salvation — viz., that it had to be fulproof and with no risk even though it would destroy our agency. What they miss is the enormity of gratititude due to Jesus because he freely went through with the atonement when it was genuinely possible for him to not go through with it. Given who Jesus is, the chance that the atonement would not occur was infinitesimally small — yet it was a real risk. Yes, the entire plan of salvation hung in the balance when Jesus was in Gethsemane, and the Father trusted his Beloved Son that much! It’s time to get rid of your Calvinist assumptions picked up in the apostasy and see the beauty of the Restoration. It is time to affirm agency and the risk in the plan of salvation. Calvinists reject that there is any risk — but that is not what modern revelation teaches about the plan of our Father.

    Comment by Blake — 3/21/2005 @ 10:30 pm

  36. Hancock has become hung up on the point that I make that it is logically possible for God to take away our agency to insure the realization of his plan. However, it is important not to get hung up on this point because it is merely a logical point. In point of fact, God always leaves us ultimately free to choose. He can insure his plan by intervening forcefully (as he did with Laman and Lemuel and Paul and Moses and Enoch and Joseph Smith … etc.) In reality, Hancock believes that God has such power but doesn’t use it. I believe that the scriptures show that God acts forcefully enough to bring to bear what should be considered psychic coercion — but I can give up that point ans imply insist that God is resourceful enough that whatever moves we make, he has move to meet it and beat and win the game.

    Comment by Blake — 3/21/2005 @ 10:33 pm

  37. I thought I ought to respond to you here before I do over at New Cool Thang, Steve.

    There are certain events that simply must be known that imply foreknowing the agency of some agents. God the father had to know that the savior would complete the atonement, for instance.

    This is, of course, an assumption on your part. It seems just as feasible that God could have a backup plan to me. The same applies to Joseph and all other prophets. I think the small plate being prepared as a backup is a fine example of this principle in action.

    We know that the second coming must be prepared and God knows when that will happen.

    I have actually written an entire post directly contradicting this statement. See here.

    I don’t buy at all the idea that God would simply take away the agency of some people to ensure that the important thing happens

    I couldn’t agree more. I’ll take that up with Blake after this comment.

    but if things aren’t going to happen, or aren’t sure to happen, why predict them?

    God can predict most things accurately — that doesn’t mean he has absolute foreknowledge, though. Have you noticed that nearly all prophesies are pretty vague and general?

    That is, the spirit of prophesy tells us the truth, not a good guess.

    This is a fine example. How often have you received a revelation of a specific event down to the second? How often do we see such prophesies in scripture? Never. God knows the script of our planet, but leaves wiggle room.

    The rest of your comment seems to restate the very objections Blake dealt with rather effectively already in his book. To me the strongest evidence you present are the quotes from Joseph, but both of those fit very nicely into the model I mentioned above about the script of this planet (and maybe all planets) being worked out already. That still leaves wiggle room for God and man when it come to the details.

    The problem is that in the model you propose we only think we are freely choosing. In reality we cannot choose otherwise because the future is as fixed as the past. With this kind of pseudo-agency is that nobody is really responsible for choices because they cannot do otherwise. It naturally leads to that pernicious fatalism I posted about today.

    Clark did try to come up with an alternate model that allowed for absolute foreknowledge without obliterating foreknowledge. He basically proposed that we all made all our choices at the moment the universe was created. His model is much like yours with us only thinking we are freely choosing but the future actually being fixed. The thing he adds is that we actually made our choices and not God. Blake shot that down pretty effectively though by noting that we must be conscious of choices to be held accountable for them.

    So the upshot is you’ve mostly said you believe in absolute foreknowledge but you still haven’t come up with a model that makes absolute foreknowledge and real free agency compatible.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — 3/21/2005 @ 10:34 pm

  38. I deal with D&C 130 and the statement quoted by Hancock from the T&S on pp. 151-54 of my book. As I have already shown, D&C 130 does not deal with foreknowledge but with the provision of blessings for the angels. In context, the statement about the “past, present and future” in the T&S deals with baptism for the dead. It is talking about how God provides for our salvation by providing baptism for the dead. Obviously, God doesn’t need foreknowledge to know who accepts the gospel — he merely needs to wait to see if those baptized by proxy will accept it. In context, the subject is God’s plan of salvation and not his foreknowledge.

    Hancock provides quotes from John Taylor and James Talmage showing that they believed God has foreknowledge. I accept that they did. However, the church authorities do not speak with one voice on this issue. On pp. 297-300 I give quotes from Brigham Young, Wilford Woodruff, Lorenzo Snow and B. H. Roberts showing that they believe that God is still learning. That entails that God’s knowledge is growing and not complete. Further (and more importantly), BY and his counselors officially declared as false doctrine the following statement by Orson Pratt that : “The Father and the Son do not progress in knowledge and wisdom because they already know all things past, present and to come.” (p. 88) That statement is declared to be false doctrine in offiical statements of the First Presidency in 1860 and again in 1865. So I’m not very impressed with what Brother Hancock has quoted. (BTW Brother Hancock, you attributed to BY words actually attributed JS (not BY) in the Teachings of the Prophet JS which were actually written by W. W. Phelps and not JS).

    As for the statement quoted from the Lectures on Faith. I show on pp. 70-72 why I believe that statement is consistent with limited foreknowledge. I agree with it wholeheartedly!

    Comment by Blake — 3/21/2005 @ 10:46 pm

  39. Brother Hancock: you are missing the point when you say that foreknowledge “doesn’t force our agency.” We both agree with foreknowledge need not entail that God causes us to do what we do. However, you must explain how God could have the kind of foreknowledge that you attribute to him and that it could be of any use to him. You have avoided that discussion and it is the very point with which you begain this thread! When you concede that “philosohically” we cannot explain how foreknowledge and free agency are consistent you seem to be saying essentially that it is a logical mess that you cannot sort out. So be it. Yet it is worse than that. We can show that: (1) absolute foreknowledge and libertarian agency are logically incompatible; (2) God’s simple foreknowlege would be providentially useless to him in any event; and (3) many scriptures assume that God does not have such foreknowledge. In fact, if God has foreknowledge then he is powerless to bring about anything other than what actually occurs — he is virtually powerless. That is reason enough to reject the view that you so tenaciously hold onto that you read it into the scriptures when it isn’t there.

    Comment by Blake — 3/21/2005 @ 10:52 pm

  40. Oops, I spent too long composing my last response to Steve and Blake beat me to the punch.

    Blake: Here is a response to the idea of God being able to render our spirits unconscious forever.

    I object to the idea on several levels. First, I wonder if there is such a thing as a spirit becoming unconscious. I mean when our body is unconscious or in a coma that doesn’t mean our spirit is too. I wonder if unconsciousness for a spirit is the same as obliteration. (Obviously there is not much in scripture on this subject)

    As for compelling people to do things: The problem is that it is unrighteous dominion. D&C 121 seems to disallow that. If the priesthood really is God’s power given to man then the same rules would apply.

    but when we undertake to … exercise control or dominion or compulsion upon the souls of the children of men, in any degree of unrighteousness, behold, the heavens withdraw themselves; the Spirit of the Lord is grieved; and when it is withdrawn, Amen to the priesthood or the authority of that man. (D&C 121:37)

    Anyway, I think God can get the job done without ever violating anyone’s agency. I think this scripture is strong evidence that it must be that way.

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — 3/21/2005 @ 11:03 pm

  41. Blake, while I never mind being lumped together with Steve, my views are not fully developed on these issues. I don’t, at this point, believe either way whether God has foreknowledge. Simply put, I am persuaded by both arguments. I do however believe that Jesus had agency and could have chosen not drink. In fact, I believe that this was the point where he decided to receive the fullness of Godhood for purely charitable reasons. Moreover, I believe that your assessment of the pre-mortal risk is correct – the largest determining factor in whether or not we kept our first estate was, I imagine, our faith in Jesus. But I do hope that you were using the term “non-sense” to denote illogical.

    Geoff: I think the example of the small plates is a pretty persuasive in the argument for exhaustive complete foreknowledge. I realize that Blake’s arguments are excellent. I recognize to, however, that there are many things for which we have oodles of physical data that lead to conflicting and paradoxical conclusions.

    Comment by J. Stapley — 3/21/2005 @ 11:07 pm

  42. Brother Hancock on argument B. Steve, while the form of the argument is original to me, the premise to which you object (B7) isn’t and it has been discussed plenty in the philosophical literature. One thing we can be sure of is that if there is a problem , it isn’t premise B7. It doesn’t merely restate or assume anything. It is a valid logical inference from the assumptions that God has foreknowledge and the past cannot be changed (both of which you accpet). It appears that you are conceding the logical argument now and retreating to the “it’s a mystery but we must believe because it is scriptural” argument. Well, it isn’t scriptural. There are plenty of very bright people who read the scritpures as you do (like Calvinists and Arminians), but I do not think that they recognize the complexity and diversity of the scriptural views. Just as the brethren in day disagree on this issue; so the writers of scritpure also seem to me to disagree. Since I don’t believe in either the uniformity or the inerrancy of scripture, such a view is not a problem for — and I don’t believe it should be a problem for any LDS for the same reasons.

    Comment by Blake — 3/21/2005 @ 11:08 pm

  43. I second Geoff’s notion that God has a back-up plan and that the second set of plates seems to be such a back-up plan. If JS had not pestered God, we would have the Book of Lehi and there would have been no need for the Small Plates at this point in our history. The atonement also seems to be such a back-up plan as well –“if Adam falls we will send a Savior” seems to indicate such a back-up plan. No Fall — no need for atonement. Yet Adam freely chose to fall so there was a plan in place if it happened (though I am also open to the possibility that God would have persuaded Adam to take on mortality if he hadn’t chosen in the way he did — heck, by telling Adam not eat and then telling him, “nevertheless, thou mayest freely choose, for it is given to thee,” seems to say “oh, go ahead and eat the darn fruit”) [No blasphemy intended — but coming from someone who believes that the Life of Brian is the apex of humor of in the 20th century, I’d be careful if I were you].

    Comment by Blake — 3/21/2005 @ 11:14 pm

  44. Geoff: You miss the point. God could render us unconscious bodily and then leave us in our bodies forever — it is just logically possible. I agree that it would be unrighteous dominion, but I believe that God is free to be unrighteous, it is just that he loses his status as a divine being if he does so.

    Comment by Blake — 3/21/2005 @ 11:15 pm

  45. J. Stapely: Sorry, I should have lumped in in there with Steve on the issue of the certainty of atonement. But you say that believe that God can change his mind and still have foreknowledge don’t you?

    Comment by Blake — 3/21/2005 @ 11:18 pm

  46. I recognize the paradox. Does it not all depend on what it means to change one’s mind?

    Comment by J. Stapley — 3/21/2005 @ 11:22 pm

  47. It sounds like we have reached an agreement on the compulsion subject, Blake. As long as compulsion is not being thrown out as part of God’s methods to fulfill prophesy I am without complaint. (Losing divine status would be a mighty high price to pay to fulfill a prophesy after all.)

    Uh, oh — We agree on that subject and on the foreknowledge subject… We’ll have to find something else to disagree about. Eternal Regress of Gods anyone?

    Comment by Geoff Johnston — 3/22/2005 @ 12:40 am

  48. S. Hancock: After having re-read the forgoing posts I apologize for not being more respectful. There are many very bright and good people who see the scriptures as you do. You have clearly taken time to think-through and attempt to work out your own view and I applaud and acknowledge that effort. Your posts have always been respectful and well-considered. So keep up the good work and thank God that you don’t have to agree with me to remain in his good graces.

    Comment by Blake — 3/22/2005 @ 9:23 am

  49. J,
    I think it does depend on what one mans by changing one’s mind. That is to say, that I belileve that given God’s attitude towards a particular behavior and his concern for our well-being, at one point, he would act in a certain way. When we begin to act in another way, then his reaction would certianly be different. Perhaps part of the problem, if one believes in foreknowledge, is that there wouldn’t be vocabulary to describe how God negotiates this situation. As always, I tend to see language and it’s limitations as of great importance.
    Blake,
    Thanks. That means a lot. It helps me see non-absolute-foreknowledge folks as not enitrely lost :). (I hope that can still sound like a joke.)
    Blake and Geoff,
    If it helps you to ease your mind in my respect, I am very willing to concede that God’s knowledge of the future may, and probably does, only extend as far as this world (Of course, there may be contemporaneously operating worlds, and I don’t want to go there.). This does help me to account for statements by Briham Young and others that God is still progressing in knowledge. I don’t know if that makes any difference to you. Also, I cross-posted part of this comment on New Cool Thang.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 3/22/2005 @ 5:48 pm

  50. S. Hancock,
    If God has exhaustive knowledge only of the events of this world, then the problem isn’t solved, it’s intensified. This means that all of the events of our world are “actual” and CAN be known. If this is the case, I find it hard to believe that you can, at the same time, choose among genuine options. For example, if God see’s that I am going to skip school tomorrow and go snowboarding, then I cannot do otherwise, because if I did I would make God wrong, and he would no longer have exhaustive foreknowledge. What defenition of freedom are you working with here? Are you a compatibilist? If so then I might see how you can hold to your theory of foreknowledge, but if believe in a libertarian type of freedom then I do not see how you can consistently hold both beliefs.

    Comment by Craig — 3/22/2005 @ 9:53 pm

  51. I have read through all of these comments and find them very interesting. I have a question that I hope someone can answer for me: I have always understood that Christ suffered for our sins in Gethsemane. He paid the debt of each of our individual sins. That event took place over 2000 years ago. If God did not have absolute foreknowledge of my sins before I committed them, how could He then have already paid the debt for them prior to my committing them? If He didn’t have absolute foreknowledge, He would not have known what the debt was until after I had committed the sins. He had to know what sins we were going to commit long before we ever committed them in order to have paid the debt. If he didn’t have this absolute foreknowledge of all of our sins before we committed them, then the Atonement would have needed to occur after all of His children on this earth had come down to be tested, so that God would then have the knowledge as to what the debt was going to be. But that’s not what happened. The Atonement took place in the meridian of time, before all of those who have lived and will live after the Atonement, such as myself, are still free to choose and commit sin. Yet those sins that I might still choose to commit have already been paid for. How could that be if God does not have absolute foreknowledge? It seems logical to me that God has absolute foreknowledge of all of our actions, mistakes, sins, etc. in order that the Atonement could take place in the meridian of time. If God doesn’t know what sins or mistakes I’m going to make tomorrow, then how could Christ have already paid for those mistakes and sins?

    In my view that doesn’t at all take away from my agency to choose what sins I will or will not commit. Simply because God knows what we are going to choose does not mean that He causes our choices. Just because I go to a movie twice and know what choices the characters in the movie are going to make because I’ve already seen the movie, doesn’t mean that I caused those characters to make those choices. I just know what those choice are.

    Comment by Amy — 6/3/2005 @ 3:30 pm

  52. Amy –

    I know that there are a lot of opinions about how the atonement works. While the idea that Christ paid for the debt quantitatively is popular (that is for each individual action), there are many who believe that He paid for our sins differently. So, I don’t necessarily see absolute foreknowledge as a requirement for the atonement…but I am rather ambivalent on this topic. 🙂

    Comment by J. Stapley — 6/3/2005 @ 5:10 pm

  53. Amy,
    With J, I will say that there are many who see the atonement as being compensatory, that is, it happened in a degree that made it worthy of atoning for whatever sins we might commit.
    I don’t think that a sort of lump sum atonemtn makes much sense myself, and I think your argument is very convincing, as do others I have spoken with on the simple forknowledge side of the debate. I really feel Alma 7 (esp 11-13) presents the atonEment as very intimate in ways that would require foreknowledge. My personal take is that Christ had to actually experience what we experienced to be a perfect judge. He is the only one who literally knows what we were going through because he went through it as well. he takes upon him our infirmities according to the flesh.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 6/3/2005 @ 5:52 pm

  54. Amy, J. and S.,

    Your comments remind me of the statement in 2 Nephi 9:21 that “he suffereth the pains of all men, yea, the pains of every living creature, both men, women, and children, who belong to the family of Adam.”

    This scripture suggests to me that Christ’s suffering was personal–that he in some sense experinced my personal pain, as well as yours. This would not necessarily require foreknowledge, but it would at least entail that the links between what we see as past, present, and future are more direct and less one-dimensional than some believe.

    Because of this view of the atonement, and because I tend to take the detailed Book of Mormon prophecies (of 1 & 2 Nephi, for example) at face value rather than as Joseph’s inspired expansions (inspired for what purpose?–to lead people to a false belief in God’s foreknowledge, perhaps?), I favor the idea that God perceives our existence from outside our timestream, whether from some timeless state or from another parallel stream, but that he is able to bridge the gap to intervene in our affairs. He is able to percieve both our future and our past, and to act within them to bring about his purposes.

    Comment by Greg — 6/18/2005 @ 8:41 am

  55. Greg,
    I very much agree. In fact, I think the only reason to think of Joseph’s translation as an expansion is to try to find a way he could give such specific prophesies without a belief in foreknowledge–to explain away something we can’t understand. The idea always seemed to me like something the Lord wouldn’t have need for: Let’s make people think I prophesied something really specific and it came true, even though such was not the case. I find it much easier to have faith that the Lord does have foreknowledge, even though I don’t understand how than to think he would make it seem as if he does when he doesn’t.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 6/18/2005 @ 6:02 pm

  56. I think we call if foreknowledge, but that’s with our limited understanding of reality. It’s all present to God. His world moves beyond the speed of light, so he doesn’t “see the future” as we perceive it. God isn’t psychic, that is too telestial a term for what He does., He’s just there through it all. It’s all present to Him.

    Comment by annegb — 6/20/2005 @ 9:35 am

  57. annegb,
    I agree that our terminology is limited. I use the term foreknowledge because it is the term others have used and because the scriptures speak of knowing the end from the beginning, which, as you point out, from our perspective, is foreknowledge, though that may only be from our perspective.

    Comment by S. Hancock — 6/20/2005 @ 6:39 pm

  58. I am one who does not have a problem with 1oo% foreknowledge of God and 100% freedom for me. I don’t see how if someone somewhere knows the future that it affects my choices. But for those who do how about this….

    What if God has absolute foreknowledge not of a fixed future, but of an infinite variety of futures. I realize that from our understanding this would be mathematically absurd, but who am I to limit God? But why is this idea far-fetched? Gods work and glory is to bring about the imortality and eternal life of man. He knows how to do this because he can see all the possibilities. No matter what I do, he knows the consequenses. He knows what would be best for everyone and when and how to intervene. This idea probably ins’t new, I have not heard of it. So what is wrong with this other than the infinite combinations involved? Would this not be similar to the master chessplayer idea? God knows all the possibilities so no matter what I do he knows what is best and can bring about his purposes. Kind of like a book with infinite endings that we choose and God is capable of accounting for. In the long run we may end up in the same way but may take different paths to get there, and God knows of all of those paths.

    Comment by OOOOT — 11/28/2005 @ 7:45 am

  59. OOOOT, this then becomes a game of statistics for God when he prophecies. It is not enough to have a knowlege of every possibility, but also to have contingincies for them. Ostler has a good treatment of this in his first volume. I argue against it here.

    Comment by J. Stapley — 11/28/2005 @ 11:59 am

  60. Yes,
    My probelm with this particular possibility is much like Jonathan’s. In this situation, God does know what happens in any particular situation, and yet, if the reults of my actions are efficacious, if they have real import, then what god needs to do now could be contingent on what I will do in a few moments. Will I heed the prompting he gives me? If not, then he should prepare some other way to accomplish his prupose, for a small example. It is even possible that two future outcomes would require conflicting preparation in the present, in which case God canonly play the odds, which doesn’t seem at all like really knowing the end from the beginning. I don’t think, certainly, that it allows for the sort of certainty associated with some very specific prophecies, and I think there are more faith-promoting options.

    Comment by Steve H — 11/28/2005 @ 1:40 pm

  61. Thank you for your comments Steve and J. I have been reading the posts on this and related topics. Fascinating stuff. All of you are way, way ahead of me in terms of philosophical vocabulary and argument catagorization. You guys make my head spin. I admire all of you (from what I read) and it seems that you all have firm gospel roots and are not just about philosophy mingled with scripture. May the Lord lead us to a better understanding of the truth.

    Comment by OOOOT — 11/28/2005 @ 2:34 pm

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